August 26, 2012

Cintron's "Discourse of Measurement"



November 1, 1998 080704637X 978-0807046371
Angels Town: Chero Ways, Gang Life, and the Rhetorics of Everyday
"As issues of power and social order loom large in Angelstown, Ralph Cintron shows how eruptions on the margins of the community are emblematic of a deeper disorder. In their language and images, the members of a Latino community in a midsized American city create self-respect under conditions of disrepect. Cintron's innovative ethnography offers a beautiful portrait of a struggling Mexican-American community and shows how people (including ethnographers) make sense of their lives through cultural forms."


discourse of measurement -- mapping and texting changed expansive land to something reigned, placed under control -- This reminds me of James Scott's Seeing Like a State with the idea of regimenting or making legible both land and people. But what is lost in this formal, structural, fictitious measuring of this ordering of that which is natural, and by being natural disordered? Prior to formal systems, indigenous people had a a concept of land that was cultural and community-based, not articulated through a discourse of exacting measurement (37). The "texting" that came to expansive nature -- the claim forms, contracts, bills of sale and even street names -- reduced overwhelming space (or perhaps the mystery of space which is not named or measured). Cintron talks about the discourse of measurement here in a way that strikes me similar to James Scott, but as Cintron's book is an ethnography, he also sees telling a story as a discourse of measurement. Such histories reduce time to visible space; the enormity to which the contents of this history point become fenced by the edges of paper. The history is contained in "an illusion of management. Question: how can we read with an eye on this illusion? To not walk away from the text thinking we "know" these people, that their story can be measured by the text, the pages? The author, the enthonographer, is acting upon texts, so the text itself is an example of an ordering of that which is messy or complex. Question: Ethics of authoring?


I am thinking about the movement in Guatemala with Maya revitalization: the Pan-Mayan Movement (http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/guatemala/pan-mayan-movement-mayans-doorway-new-millennium). What are the "fences" of this movement? What is the rhetoric? What will be the consequence of Maya lawyers, doctors, and poets in Guatemalan politics? What will happen to the milpas, chicleros, and weaving traditions? It seems that many Mayas in the highlands want subsistence living; they don't want to participate in the free market or politics, and educating their children for careers that place Mayas in the market economy, which is synonymous with government, will put the indigenous way of life in danger. Thus, have not the Maya been resisting the discourse of measurement all along? How has Rigoberta Menchu participating in the discourse of measurement (both the mapping and texting)? Cintron writes that the state cannot exist without a recorded relationship (maps and texts); they cannot manage individuals of the state without evoking the discourse of measurement. Thus, a major function of writing and other recording devices is this management of individuals and nature. However, it is merely a "representation of reality" in documents, documents that distance because of the lack of face-to-face contact (relationships). It is this distance(53) that makes genocidal atrocities possible, and it is this distance that also provides space for resistance and resilience. As Cintron talks to and about Valerio's wall, iconography, and literacy, I was thinking a lot about the indigenous Ka'quikel kids in Chimeltenago, Guatemala. Valerio's teachers wanted him to write "right"-- the structuralist approach that pervades all English classrooms -- they labeled him LD, and it took a lot of time and wounds to get him to believe he was, in fact, smart, and that he could, in fact, write his desires (rather than the formulaic paragraph). I am wondering what will happen when the children from the milpas get a pencil in their hands and begin to write their desires? If a page is blank but we (the measurers of the state) give them the page and the pen, are we writing on them ideas of modern desires? How long will these children stay in school? Perhaps long enough to read a little, write a little, and learn a little math - but perhaps not long enough. They will work with and for their family as soon as they are useful. And then, will they return to the milpa or the loom with ideas of "algo mas" (Fisher) and modernity? Will they turn away from the Maya ways because of school? Do Maya families desire education for their children or is that society's desire? I am now thinking about the poor public school system in Guatemala that provides an 8-12 day of schooling up to 6th grade (18% attend secondary school; 1% attend university). Is this measuring a mechanism for just enough participation in the free market economy but not enough to participate in the structures that control this economy? They are consumers in capitalism not participators in democracy --what Cintron calls a "warped citizenship" (126).

Cintron talks about Beth Roy's idea of "implicit ideology," and I think this is was I am pondering above.Bodies of ideas or ideologies can become so internalized that they disappear as ideas but reappear as emotions and truths -- a common sense understanding of the world so ingrained as to be beyond question and, at the same time, outside consciousness. Let's think about ideas about food and family, for example. The Maya who reside in the Highlands, have a family milpa that may be an hour or two walk from where they live. This milpa provides the corn they need to feed their family for the year and a little more for trading (for other food, medicine, soap). The family clears the milpa, plants the milpa, harvests the milpa. The milpa is an idea that became a truth of the Maya. As measuring changes -- zoning, taxes, sales, transportation -- the implicit ideology shifts. The Maya had to see land as "owned" by the state and were forced to accept the mapping and be marginalized by the "texts" that accompanied such mapping. I could go into this further as one way of thinking about the escalation of mapping and marginalization (and ultimate murder) of the Maya.

Cinton's work ultimately asks how one creates respect under conditions of little or no respect, and while he is exploring how the cheros, Cecilia's continuum of modernity in the neighborhood (222), and how they create respect in the discourse of measurement, I think his study has generalizable features. He writes, "We might imagine a variety of societies, then, urging their citizenry toward the modern in a variety of ways -- and, therefore, simultaneously defining the backward in a variety of ways. Of course, those defined as backward may also, in turn, resist the modern in a variety of ways. And so it goes, the plethora of ways that modernity can take" (227). I saw, for example, widows who are using their traditional dyes and weaving methods as a way of supporting their families: they started a co-operative with other widows to pull together their textiles, rent space in a market, and save money towards the purchase of a building. They have business cards and a website. While most speak the native Quiche, some of the women are bilingual and have enough education to read, write and do the necessary math for their cooperative. They are maintaining their tradition and participating in the market. Chicleros have also reclaimed their craft and have begun a cooperative that no only sells the raw chicle to companies in America (like Glee Gum who advertises this heavily), but one cooperative actually manufacture a fully biodegradable gum marketing it as that which will save towns the clean up costs of the biodegradable, synthetic chewing gums.

Here we see Cintron's second point about the discourse of measurement. He writes, "The discourses of measurement tend to belittle other knowing systems -- implicitly, if not explicitly -- or at least to make a prior discourse of measurement obsolete. ...These displaced ways of knowing and talking represent a precision that may now be taken as one more sign of backwardness when compared to the discourses of modernity" (213). Indeed the discourse of measurement that regimented the expansive Maya land, and the state or plantation land that Maya families cannot afford to buy back (to expand their milpas to provide for their growing families) has pushed Maya ways of knowing to extinction for some families, specifically ones that have to travel to work in factories or move to live in factory towns (abandoning all traditional methods of life and living). This leads into Cintron's third point: "The security that a discourse of measurement offers may increase dependence and a certain anxious expectation concerning the power of its control" (214). Indeed, the government might like for all Mayas to abandon their milpas and come to the cities where they can be made legible (be measured). The land and life they abandon in the highlands will leave a great deal of fertile land for the major corporations,and the people will be thorough absorbed into the economic sphere (Cintron's fourth point about the discourse of measurement) -- the sphere subsistence farmers have avoided for a century.

However, the Maya have worked hard not to make their prior discourse of measurement obsolete. Some Maya (specifically Tecpan) allocate a portion of their milpas for export crops (a risky shift that requires knowledge of cultivating new crops, understanding fertilzation, the distribution business, and new taxes) which allows them a semblance of their traditional subsistance farming; or, as mentioned above, using their skills previously used for subsistence living to participate in niche markets (textiles, gum).

As I am writing here, I an keenly aware of Cintron's argument about ethnography. Writing about a people is one discourse of measurement among many that attempts to shape or made order out of that which is overwhelmingly expansive and complex.

August 16, 2012

Testimonio

Zimmerman, Marc.  Literature and Resistance in Guatemala: Textual Modes and Cultural Politics from El Senor Presidente to Rigoberta Menchu. Volume Two. Ohio: Monographs, 1995.

testimonio
  • reveals the hidden secrets of popular traditions in relation to questions of resistances
  • provide access to situations and forms of thought unknown  or poorly understood by officially sanctioned culture
  • bridges dimensions of the state, social class, and  military institutions (sociology) with , popular traditions and every day life (anthropology) 
  • literary testimonio -- as an aesthetically  rich and generally linear first person narration of socially and collectively significant experiences, in which the narrative voice is that of a typical or extraordinary witness or protagonist  who metonymically represents  other individual or groups that have lived through other, similar situations or the circumstances which induce them
  • collective representativeness -- intertextual dialogue of voices, reproducing but also creatively reordering historical events in a way which impresses as representative and true and which projects a vision of life and society in need of transformation (12)
  • a genre marked by it status as a subaltern discourse, which came to speak from the perspective of middle or lower sectors frustrated, repressed, marginalized, or exploited under capitalism
  • democratic humanism (Duchesne) -- the recuperation of those marginalized by the processes of capitalist modernization throughout the third world; the oppresses, repressed, and humiliated takes a stances against the dominant cultural forms and elaborates  its own discursive space; this process takes place with the mediation of an intelligentsia that by definition is lettered (a person who can read and write must mediate the story of the subaltern who is not lettered)
  • so...is it mediated or unmediated? Can true testimonio be unmediated? Achugar says that it is inevitably mediated with the intervention of and for the benefit of the lettered; whereas, the left says it is an unmediated voice of a revolutionary-tending social subject constructed as the people.
  • Zimmerman and Beverly say that it is a form that takes its place in the struggle for the middle sectors, which are so often crucial in supporting and opposing revolutionary struggles
  • Beverly -- a novella-length first person narrative recounted  by the protagonist or witness to the events recounted; testifying or bearing witness and the overall narrative unit is a life or a significant life experience; defined by its conflictive relation with established literary-aesthetic norms and with the institution of literature itself
  • often at the margins of literature -- representing women, the insane, the criminal, the proletarian -- excluded from authorized representation
  • defined as a nonfictional , popular-democratic form of epic narrative, since the narrative "I"  has a metonymic function as part of its narrative convention and since the form implies that any life so narratwd can have a kind of representivity
  • each given testimony  evokes an implicit polyphony of other possible voices, lives, and experiences, and testimonio then involves an erasure of authorial presences and intentionality which makes possible a "comradely complicity between narrator and interlocutor and/or reader" (14)
  • interlocutor's function -- what if the narrator requires (which it likely does) an interlocutor with a different ethnic or class background to elicit, edit, publish, and distribute the text? The function can lead to a one-sided questioning  or editing that results in a reactionary articulation of the testimonio as a kind of costumbrismo of the subaltern or the smothering of a genuine popular voice by a well-intentioned but repressive notion of correctness; 
  • the narrator-compiler relationship can stand as a figure for the possible union of a radical intelligentsia and the masses -- a combination which has been decisive in the development of third world movements for social change
  • gives voices to the previously voiceless, anonymous, collective pueblo
  • suggests not charity but solidarity between the intelligentsia and the masses
  • audience -- the readinb public which is still class-limited in advanced capitalist  societies; the complicity the form establishes with readers involves their identification with what they may well have seen as an alien or at least distant popular cause; by breaking down distance, testimonio has been important in maintaining and developing the practice of third world solidarity movements (15)
  • illusory -- the effect has been produced by a narrator and a compiler;  the direct narrator uses oral story-telling tradition and the compiler makes a text out of the material; a metonymic trace of the real
  • novel -- private form; both the story and subject end with the end of the text
  • testimonio - -the narrator is a real person who continues living and acting in a real social history that also continue; it cannot be analyzed as a text within itselfness
  • calls into question the very institution of literature as an ideological apparatus of alienation and domination; "for the form to have become more and more popular in recent years, means that there are experiences in the world today which cannot be adequately expressed  in forms like the novel, the short story, the lyric poem, or the autobiography == in other words, which would be betrayed by literature as we know it -- Why
  • extraliterary or even antiliterary discourse which is its aesthetic effect
  • interlocutor -- interviewer as mediator, interviewer as creative and therefore distorting interlocutor, as censor, editor, conveyor of testimony to those whose literary, ideological, and political norms are shaped by the written word
  • Zimmerman argues that given the complex play of international, regional, and national forces, testimonio cannot necessarily signify any decisive or definitive transformation.

August 14, 2012

Farnham: "Ethical Ambiguity" and Teaching about Atrocities


Farnham, J.F. (1983). Ethical ambiguity and the teaching of the Holocaust. English
Journal, 72(3) , 519-542.

Farnham argues for an educational system that tries to sensitize students to ethical matters and to cultivate both complexity and ambiguity in ethics.  His experiences teaching about the Holocaust through literature suggest that the impact of witnessing prisoners and victims abandon their moral codes and follow ethical values geared to survival can rupture a student's binary of good and evil.  Our socially constructed notions of what and who is good or evil come with us as we bear witness/listen to stories of atrocity. We expect an S.S. man to be a "moral monster" just as we expect the "victim to be good and innocent," so when students read about what the victim does to survive (see my notes on Never Fall Down), their preconceived notions/stereotypes interrupt "authentic, analytic responses." Farnham writes: "We honor victims more easilyif they are recognizably more innocent like...Martin Luther King, whereas we tend to say that victims whose qualities violate our own sense of morality deserve what they got" (63).  If we can select or lead students to inquiry about the "ordinary" victims -- ones who do not fit the hero or martyr stock character --  and if we can create a framework of ideas for students to critically engage -- we can trouble this binary. Farnham asks, "Do victims have to be innocent to make their death significant to us?" 

This might be a good place to refer back to Walter Mignolo's work in The Darker Side of Western Modernity (see my notes on that, too).  He talks about the rhetoric of Western modernity based on the logic of coloniality. Where this is relevant is that we -- students and teachers linked with Western rhetoric and coloniality -- come to bear witness as readers/listeners with the values of our Western culture.  Farnham, however, says that because the Nazi's, when speaking about Holocaust literature, "disavowed the Western tradition of the dignity of the individual person" that what was left was a "moral vacuum, a world without traditional ethical values, and it was within this world that the victims tried to survive, some successfully by abandoning their former ethical values in a world without culture, a world in which traditional ethical values, through no fault of the victims, were absent" (64). While I certainly agree that the camps were a moral vacuum, I am not convinced that Hitler was, in fact, not enacting Western ideology and working within the logic of coloniality. There is little in Western culture that values an individual or sees every human being worthy of dignity. Western ideology values the "1%" or what Mignolo identified as all but the 80% of the population living "without."

The "lamb-like" victims that Farnham argues students want to see when they read about atrocities is evidence of Western rhetoric, which has indoctrinated students with notions of America as good, with victims as innocent, with soldiers and guerrillas as bad; thus, when students encounter a victim surviving at the cost of stealing food from a fellow victim or digging a mass grave for another victim or even invoking a punishment upon fellow man for the sake of survival, students/readers/listeners face a crisis because for this victim to fit into the binary, the student must decide the victim was at fault somehow. And how can we say the victim can be held to the same moral standard when imprisoned in this moral vacuum? So the framework of pedagogy needs to provide support for making sense of why students experience this crisis, why they want to turn way or blame rather than reconstruct notions of good and evil  (the Gorgon effect from Clendinen). Farnham writes, " We are in no position to judge the actions of people forced to live without the support of their culture and its values" (64). Here, he is talking about the Judeo-Christian culture whereby to judge a deed morally is to interpret it without context -- and to an extent that is what our students lean toward. How does the logic of death -- certain and irrefutable -- fit with the cultural logic of ethical behavior? 

In the "ethical behavior" section, Farnham talks about the importance of education to sensitize its students to ethical matters of our culture. The ethics that I see in the schools are those of capitalism and free market -- those who work hard get ahead; those who prepare for and participate in the market deserve to be successful; those who are not rich are not rich because they didn't work hard; competition breeds greatness not fairness; and equality is based on opportunity not on the conditions of that opportunity. What Farnham argues in this section is that for a deed to be moral, it need not conform to external principles of authority ( I think he means Judeo-Christian) but that because it "contributes to another person's freedom can make that deed moral in itself (but isn't that a principle?_). I guess the idea here is to bring in notions of obedience and conformity as not necessarily being moral but that we are free to choose or to "determine the moral nature of our deeds" (65), which requires a critical consciousness (thinking of Freire here). 

Now we can think about how ethics reflect culture. I want to make a comparison here that might not work. In literature of atrocity, we can see the logic of ethics in a moral vacuum -- one of survival that is outside of the culture in which the victim lived or was raised.  Behavior may change when people lose the support of their habitual culture. Farnham writes, "...the Holocaust was a rupture in Western culture and thus in Western values." I know what he means here, in the sense that Western culture valued human dignity. However, and here is my comparison, can we begin to think how Western culture and Western values do not value human dignity? Can we talk about how what we see in literature of atrocity and testimony of victims is a consequence of Western rhetoric and the logic of coloniality taken to its logical outcome?  The "normal" environment from which the victims are taken might actually be a facade of sorts, that hegemonic forces constructed and allowed until....? So the argument from Farnham that people can still act freely and ethically without the support of authority holds -- yes, we can and should provide this framework for critical engagement. Mignolo would call this delinking, I think. But, I suggest that teaching about atrocities provides a framework for students to see the rhetoric that has constructed their culture. (I am now imagining if readers in third world countries would experience the same crisis reading literature of atrocity as Western readers. Would they be appalled or think the victims are behaving amorally as they struggle to survive? In McCormick's rendering of Arn Chorn-Pond's experience suriving the "killing fields," did she  impose her rhetorically shaped Western values in the theme about survival's guilt?)

As Farnham suggests that what is latent in the Western tradition in literature and thus student expectations is "the assumption that heroes in books should be models of good behavior," and what "good behavior" means is also part of that tradition, a tradition that schools cultivate, a tradition that, as I have been arguing, is about conforming to Western rhetoric and the logic of coloniality -- capitalism rather than social democracy.


  • ·         An education system which does not try to sensistize its students to ethical matters fails
  • ·         What materials do you use to sensitize students to ethical matters?
  • ·         Ethical values are one of the voices with which culture speaks to use
  • ·         Examples of individuals and groups whose moral behavior disintegrated when they were deprived of the support of culture
  • ·         What happens when we lose touch with the morals our culture teachers and conditions us to observe
  • ·         Not every deed to be moral must be performed in obedience to some external principle of authority; performing a deed because it contributres to another person’s freedom can make that deed moral in itself
  • ·         Existential approach to ethics – a deed is good because it contributes to another person’s freedom to be, not because it conforms to some external principle of authority, our freedom being that which defines us as human
  • ·         Simone de Beauvoir in the Ethics of Ambiguity – choice and the responsibility which dervies from free choice;
  • ·         Michael Siegel, We want to encourage the growth of citizens who can say no to authority when they judge the response necessary
  • ·         Ethical behavior is not necessarily obedient behavior, not merely conformity to an external set of values – when we practice our freedom, we make ourselves more available to error than if we were to obey a fixed set of values which brook no ambiguity
  • ·         While culture may support us in acting ethically, we are free at all times under all conditions to determine the moral nature of our deeds, as long as we are not deprived  of consciousness and self-awareness
  • ·         Surveys the literary texts where ethically ambiguous occurrences reveal ethical choices without cultural support –

July 22, 2012

Menchu, the story of ALL Guatemalans?

I, Rigoberta Menchu, and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans by David Stoll (1992) refutes elements of the taped testimony and autobiography of Rigoberta Menchu (I, Rigoberta Menchu)  by Elisabeth Burgos-Debray (1982). Stoll's central argument is that the Burgos account of Menchu's story served to support the guerrillas because she focused all the blame for the violence (genocide) on the government. Furthermore, Menchu put a human face on a clandestine movement (URNG), but as a Maya, she also validated the guerrilla's claim that their revolutionary movement represented the interests of the indigenous peoples who comprised nearly half of Guatemala's ten million people. So while Menchu went on to earn the Nobel Peace prize and brought international attention to the violence and political unrest in Guatemala, Stoll seems to argue that Burgos' book, in fact,  misrepresented the guerrilla's actual work and the role of the indigenous peoples in the revolution.

It seems that the first place where Menchu is clearly uniting guerrillas and peasants is when the meaning of companeros shifts from villager to guerrilla in the mountains saying "once the Indian opens his heart to them, all those in the mountains will be his brothers. We didn't feel deceived as we did with the army"(204). However, for an Indian to join the guerrillas he has to perform a death ceremony with his family for the purpose of passing on traditions or 'secrets' of the culture. This clearly aligns some Indians with guerrillas, but the question is whether or not the guerrillas were, in fact,part of the unionizing efforts and land rights organizations. Was this, perhaps, just Menchu's experience of intersecting ideologies or was she exploited by the guerrillas or did she exploit indigenous peoples for the guerrillas anti- government campaign?

When Menchu talks about the development of CUC, she says, "when those student, peasant and worker's leaders died together in the embassy, we knew we had an alliance and we looked at how we would confront the policies of the government together"(231). In 1981, this became the 31st January Popular Front to honor those killed in the Spanish embassy on that day; so while she says the CUC incorporates all peasants, she goes on to say "we" used real bombs but also propaganda bombs (233). However, later she decides her role is not with the CUC but another faction of the popular front, one with a Christian foundation saying she would not take up arms: "the people, the masses, are the only ones capable of transforming society"(246). She says she will teach her people to build a people's church not the Catholic church.

Misrepresentation might be the problem of "non-fiction" and testimony -- if only one testimony is given voice, then such an experience is in danger of essentializing a people. Thus, Stoll's efforts in his book to take multiple testimonies and to refute aspects of Burgos' rendering of Menchu's testimony, THE testimony of Indios, seem to be a worthy historical project: the doing of history. In showing the rhetorical function of Menchu's story, Stoll makes visible the rhetoric of modernity. I argue, and Stoll may argue this too as I am not finished with his book, civilians had to be rhetorically aligned with the guerrillas and Rigoberta had to be the face of the revolution (not an armed, male, dressed in fatigues -- a symbol of communism/socialism that prompted the US military support in the 60s/70s) for the Western/colonial forces to take notice and to facilitate peace talks. As it was, the West was not interested in peasant land rights because the allocation of land suited the free market well (e.g., the United Fruit Company).

Tree Girl a young adult novel written by Ben Mikaelsen (2004) complicates Menchu's account as well and seems to support Stoll's argument in that the protagonist, Gabriela Flores, and her Quiche canton do not have any affiliation with the guerrillas or the government. The plot shows how the villagers are careful not to take sides in the conflict despite the guerrillas efforts to say they were helping the canto get land rights and the government checking to see if the Quiche learned Spanish (a sign that the different ethnic Indios were now collaborating) and later outlawing machetes. The protagonist notes how she can tell the difference between the guerrillas and the soldiers (sometimes pretending to be guerrillas to get information) because of the modern weapons (American) they carried. So this story, like Stoll, want to complicate the context of the political unrest and show that the Indios were not necessarily aligned with the guerrilla movement anymore than they were content with the government land policies.I think Grandin's book, The Last Colonial Massacre, does a nice job of presenting the complexity of the Guatemala's political history including all the different revolutionary groups, their leaders, their objectives, and successes with failures -- using several testimonies but a great deal of primary sources.

Stoll clearly indicates that Menchu and Burgos' work brought international pressure for Guatemala to participation in UN sponsored peace talks. Guatemala's civilian government, army, and guerrilla movement signed a peace agreement in 1996.  The international community negotiated with human rights certification and trade packages, but it was Menchu who turned a local situation into a dramatic international symbol (would Mignolo call this rhetoric of modernity, the logic of coloniality?).

Oral testimonies like I, Rigoberta Menchu have become controversial (see my post about Zimmerman's description of testimonio). Indigenous and other marginalized groups are insisting on equality so they are less willing to have their words mediated by outsiders including anthropologists accustomed to speaking and writing on behalf their behalf. (thinking of Linda Tuhiwai Smith who advocates for Maori to write about Maori). Stoll shares his experience coming face to face with Menchu at a conference where he presented Menchu with the "real" account of the death of her brother: "Whites have been writing our history for five hundred years, and no white anthropologist is going to tell me what I experienced in my own flesh" (227). One of facts that Stoll refutes is that Menchu was, in fact, educated and did, in fact, speak Spanish. If this is the case, why, then did Menchu  need Elisabeth Burgos as "the intermediary" who shaped Menchu's story for publication.  Stoll argues that Menchu was sufficiently literate throughout the book and questions why Menchu neglected to tell this part of her story. The question remains of this testimonio (and for the genre more generally) as to who authored the book. If Stoll is arguing that it was Menchu, and that Menchu was indeed literature,  then the question he needs to be asking why Menchu used Burgos as an intermediary -- especially if the taped testimony was not intended to become a book? And if there is a question as to Burgos' faithful rendering of the taped tesimony, that answer can be easily determined by listening to the tapes. Stoll says he listed to 2 hours of it. It seems to me that such an investigation should have been Stoll's first step. Ultimately, Stoll concludes that "contrary to the laureate's occasional statements to the contrary, there is every reason to believe that I, Rigoberta Menchu is her own account of her life" (183).  Burgos who has edited more than one oral testimony says,
The person feels carried away by her voice, her memory, and above all her capacity to improvise. She imagines, but in a true manner, on the basis of events that have happened, such that what is imagined has a real dimension...I have become aware that they relate, as their own experiences, what they could not have witnessed directly, what instead happened in proximity to their own histories. It is not that they act in bad faith, nor that they lie.  Instead, they are moved by a feeling of belonging. This feeling of belonging, of identifying with peoples, occurs when they feel empowered to elaborate their own version of history...It is not the same as reflecting on the basis of writing. The act of telling a story orally requires recreating  what happened through images , it requires setting a stage, like a theater director would, and requires what theater does -- to demonstrate. (199)

Therefore, I think that Stoll's anthropological approach to refuting Menchu's "own story" is ultimately insufficient if we are to understand history. Narratives are already incomplete with gaps and fissures -- whether it is testimonio, autobiography or even an anthropological text. A critical reader knows this and accepts this.

What Stoll could have done with this book was to take more thorough testimonies to examine the narrative process along with exploring the experience being the intermediary. Would he see the imagining that Burgos notices in her storytellers? Stoll admits that this would have been one way to do it-- the comparison of narrative (but I guess that is left for the reader). He wanted to evaluate oral testimony using documents that could set parameters (e.g., land contracts and human rights reports).  But such documents are also partial narratives and such documents are not the work of testimonio nor does testimonio claim to be.Stoll talked to Beverley and George Yudice, literary scholars. Beverley defined testimonio as a story "by a narrator who is also a real protagonist or witness of the event he or she recounts" while Yudice feints it as "an authentic narrative, told by a witness who...portrays his or her own experience as an agent (rather than a representative) of a collective memory and identity" (242). Stoll argues that Menchu's book was not testimonio because it fails the eye witness test, but he seems most upset by our "unfortunate tendency to idolize native voices that serve our own political and moral needs, as opposed to others that do not" (242). I think he is really referring to his refutation as something that does not serve our needs.


 Indeed, readers should step back from any text and weigh reliability, but what is Stoll exactly trying to prove? I think he is trying to expose how I, Rigoberta Menchu was a work of Western rhetoric. Menchu appealed to the Western expectation of native peoples; he argues that Menchu was charming her audience to get a hearing with mythic inflation (232) -- monolingualism, illiteracy, rejection of Western technology. There is a danger of essentializing a people and distorting debates about indigenous issues. I think, based on what I have read and my own conversations with the Maya, that Stoll's secondary argument that Menchu is not necessarily speaking for ALL Guatemalans is more convincing and can at least be argued with claims and evidence.  Is it fair to say that all peasants were ideologically committed to revolution? He writes, "Although some peasants acknowledge being attracted to the revolutionary vision, their moment of decision usually follows the onset of army retaliation. They face a grim choice between surrendering to army killers, escaping to coastal plantations, or casting their lot with the insurgency, if only by staying in a village over which the guerrillas are asserting control" (191-2).

What I, Rigoberta Menchu  does  -- and I think this is Stoll's contribution -- is that it is functions as a "symbol that resolves painful contradictions by transcending them with a healing image," and what that painful contradiction is depends on the beholder. The beholder is the white middle class and the symbol functions to bring the gap between privilege or Western values and its opposite. The symbol identifies a common enemy -- here the Guatemalan army. The privileged and the unprivileged, according to Stoll, can stand on the same side. The symbol is a unifying image.  Imagine, however,  if Menchu would have identified the US government who trained the Guatemalan army in her testimony. (Menchu narrated When Mountains Tremble, when this information was clearly presented; she seemed to know the US role in the genocide, yet she did not talk about the US or use the word genocide in her testimony.)  Menchu was making an argument for peace in her country; she needed to get her story out there, and she seemed to know what story was going to achieve that goal. Her story is both a narrative and an argument, but Stoll wants to say that we are caught up in that argument , privileging a story, and essentializing a people which takes us further from understanding life of Guatemalans.

"Only by establishing chronologies, vantage points, and probabilities can we have any hope of evaluating the reciprocal stories of victimization that are used to justify violence, or how these claims become rationales for larger political interests, or how human beings can be induced into committing mayhem" (274).The concern I hear is how cultural studies and postmodernism can be and have been used to silence inquiry by doing what Stoll says is " reducing intellectual discourse to relations of power and dismissing opposed points of view as reactionary. Scholars have to be able to critique a text to consider the different imaginings of the "other" and to consider what's behind privileging one version of a history over another. Stoll argues that the consequence of publishing this rendering of Menchu's story with the guerrilla movement depicted as a movement for and with the peasants was a Novel peace prize that prolonged a war because it was tailored to the propaganda needs of a guerrilla movement that had lost hope and leverage; the war continued for another fourteen years even thought it did use the international human rights movement to keep pressure on the Guatemalan army and finally obtain the December 1996 peace agreement (which may have been resolved earlier had the book told a different story).

While I, Rigoberta Menchu presents a tale of the necessary guerrilla movement to resist government oppression, Stoll concludes his book by asking What gave rise to such ferocious regimes  in the first place? And Greg Grandin offers an answer to this in his book The Last Colonial Massacre.  Similar to Grandin's argument, Stoll explains that the US bears much of the responsibility for this progressively violent militarization of the Guatemalan government. And the guerrilla movement has to accept responsibility for positioning the peasants as military targets, specifically indigenous groups who do not share the revolutionary vision. The imagery of native insurrection spread through the rhetoric of I, Rigoberta Menchu (notice that I am careful not to say that it was Menchu, specifically) was critical to romanticizing the guerrilla movement and its legitmacy. Stoll has argued that the Menchu family was not representative of the poorest peasants and that the idea of a guerrilla insurgency actually originated  in the plans of nonindigenous revolutionaries (Ladinos and ex-government agents as depicted in Tree Girl, When Mountains Tremble,  and Granito).  The middle class  radicals seeking solidarity with the countryside is an "urban romance" that is "more likely to kill off the left than build it" (282). 
  • Grandin, Greg. The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2004. Print.
  • Menchú, Rigoberta, and Elisabeth Burgos-Debray. I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala. London: Verso, 1984. Print.
  • Menchú, Rigoberta, and Ann Wright. Crossing Borders. London: Verso, 1998. Print.
  • Mikaelsen, Ben. Tree Girl: A Novel. New York: HarperTempest, 2004. Print.
  •  Stoll, David. Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999. Print.

July 20, 2012

Signs of Change: Past and Present Cultural Landscapes of Guatemala, 2012

Signs of Change: Past and Present Cultural Landscapes of Guatemala, 2012

Posada de Don Rodrigo, Antigua

Casa Herrera, owned and operated by the University of Texas at Austin and Fundacion Pantaleon: curriculum development


Iximche --Lake Atitlan: pre-colonial archaeological site


Posada de Don Rodrigo, Panajachel
 
San Pedro, women's weaving collectives

Chichicastenango: market, center of K'iche Maya culture

Santo Tomas Church: Maya and Catholic rituals blended

Proyecto Linguistico Francisco Marroquin: Kachiquel language presentation

Patchali School: primary school

Tikal National Park
 
Jaguar Inn

July 19, 2012

"Radical [or Thick] Democracy" (Lensmire)


When I titled this blog "Thick Democracy," I had in mind a kind of democracy beyond the form of capitalism the United States is offering the world in then name of "progress" and "development" (that from which Mignolo argues a delinking). I am not interested in markets or globalization or domination or producing workers for the "free market" who live to work rather than work to live. I certainly do not mean the monocultural tradition of our nation. Nor do I see democracy as episodes of voting and majority rules. That democracy sit in the realm of what Mignolo calls the "rhetoric of modernity" veiled in the "logic of coloniality.' When I say democracy, thick democracy, what I mean is what Carr refers to in "Educating for Democracy": democracy is living inclusively, participatory, and with critical engagement that avoids jingoistic patriotism and a passive prescriptive ways of being. For Tim Lensmire, democracy means something similar. He sees it as Dewey did: "a way of life" that guides and expresses itself in our everyday habits and interactions with others. Because I am a teacher does not mean that my interest in education is restricted to the four walls of a classroom. No, as Dewey wrote in an essay about the rise of fascism in 1951, democracy should be in sites were we live:

When I think of the conditions under which men and women are living in many foreign countries today, fear of espionage, with danger hanging over the meeting of friends for friendly conversation in private gatherings, I am inclined to believe that the heart and final guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings of neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of the day, and in gatherings of friends in the living rooms of houses and apartments to converse freely with one another. (392)

When we think about our schools, we hear news reports about teachers and data about test scores and financial incentives for teachers who can raise those test scores. We don't hear a lot about the companies creating those very tests or the testing market. Why aren't we talking about living? Why are we talking about living democracy? Because if we name our current state of schooling, it might be called how living free market or living capitalism. If we focus on life in the classroom, we can get closer to that inclusive, participatory, and critical engagement that we need, and I say we as a human beings, not as America or the United States. We are human beings, and our students need to live a life that resonates with all human beings not Western-centric ways of knowing, but human ways of knowing and being. 

Lensmire talks about the writing workshop as a "blueprint for democratic living," and while I will include note about that here, I ultimately want to think about the novel, specifically literature of atrocities (Langer),  is a blueprint for living. Essentially, I think that how we teach and what we teach has to be thick democratic practice, but I think teaching and living both require a willingness to enter crisis and work through crisis, to experience disequilibrium and find equilibrium. And the literature of atrocity seeks to create this framework just at the writing workshop does. In both frameworks, you can only come to some sense of knowing if you encounter and then work through crisis. Clenndinen talks about the Gorgon effect where when people are faced with something hideous, or a crisis, then turn away or reject it, but I am suggest, along with scholars of critical pedagogy, that we disrupt the status quo so that we can feel that critical engagement and participate in constructing not just knowledge but lived experience.

Lensmire applies Bakhin's description of carnival as a metaphor for democracy and thus living democracy in the classroom. He identifies several important features of the carnival. The first is "participation for all" where the line between spectator and performer is blurred. The second is "free and familiar contact among people" where there is a disorderly mixing of people but with a free and familiar attitude over everything.  Next is a playful , familiar relation to the world. Writing workshops, advocated by Donald Graves and Nancie Atwell,  apply these features do not lock students in the spectator role like traditional classrooms because the students are active producing authors  or engage writing companions not consuming readers (or consumers in capitalism).  There is a free and familiar movement where students are writing alone, conferencing, sharing lessening the social distance among themselves and the teacher. Of course, Lensmire cautions teachers from falling into the traditional hierarchical roles when it comes to facilitating the workshop or evaluating rather than clarifying intentions of student writing. Thus, we see that the writing workshop is lives democratic social relations and encourages an engagement with school tasks transforming writing into a playful, familiar relation to the world. They see the effect of what they have to say on multiple audiences. So we see here how the workshop disables the social order of capitalism or Western ideology of development and growth that needs to evaluate, consume and is product oriented.

One concern of the writing workshop is a similar concern with the rhetoric of modernity and that is of individualistic efforts and rewards. Indeed, individualism does, as Berlin (1988) writes a "denunciation of economic, political, and social pressures to conform" (486), it is lacking that social aspect of democracy. Students can target an authority figure like Lensmire describes (17), but they need to retain that ambivalent quality (getting at the crisis or discomfort I mentioned earlier) in order to get at the "critical" engagement I also cited earlier.  These are still "carnavalescque" as Lensmire argues because of one more aspect Bakhtin talks about and that is the profane nature of carnivals where there is abuse and people are laughed at, but for Bakhin, as Lensmire argues, " profanation is profoundly ambivalent -- that is, both negative and positive, both destructive and regenerating" (11). And so I think this is the potential of the writing workshop to be "thick." While the workshop can be situated in personal narratives, students can push their writing in a change that challenges aspects of their world like Dewey's street corner conversations about the uncensored news. Lensmire writes, "for Bakhtin, carnival abuse represented an explicit, collective struggle with an oppressive social order. At best writing workshops as currently imagined, might allow for individual dissent. At worst, they might shut down even this, because their guiding visions provide no real resource for making sense of and responding to student resistance and opposition" (20). I would argue that this is where we are in America, too. 

Not only is there an issue with the teacher's role, but we also have to be concerned with how students, human beings, treat one another. Lensmire says, "My worry is that this openness and fluidity is only apparent, that beneath it are more stable patterns of peer relations among children that divide them, subordinate some to others, and routinely deny certain children the help and support that others receive from peers" (21). Of course, if we can unmask and subvert these structures in our schools, imagine what will happen in the lived spaces outside the institution. In his book, Powerful Writing, Responsible Teaching, he tells stories of how such valuations and devaluations of peers were acted out in social/physical patterns and the stories in the workshop. Lensmire explains that the stories we write and live are acting out how the world and we are "supposed" to be and then what we might "imagine" ourselves and the world to be. The "supposed" might be the free market, consumer-oriented, the-strong-survive culture of America, and the "imagined" might be that which students cannot say or do or would like to say or do -- this might be in that hegemonic frame, but it might also be in a more liberatory frame. I had a student writes a short story about bullying, and she rendered the bully from her own experience and created a new character, the protagonist, to be an upstander. When I asked her to talk to me about her choices, the students said, "Because I couldn't do it. Because I know I should be an upstander, but I want somewhere to sit at lunch, and I can't afford to stand up." This was the canonical peer culture that Jerome Bruner (1990) talks about. So we see that the writing workshop has the potential to contribute to the more humane, inclusive, participatory democracy -- thick democracy -- where they learn relations with the world through peer relations. In these spaces of interaction, multiple world views, potentially conflicting world views, perform a sort of crisis that people can, in fact, embrace rather than reject -- that is, if we can learn to welcome and value this sort of critical engagement.

In a traditional school, and even in some schools labeled "progressive," students learn that their success actually depends on avoiding conflict and conforming to the rules and expectations of their teachers. The teacher has the power. I don't think there is anyway around this, for even when I "give up my power," I am using my power to do so. I don't actually want to give up my power or be a neutral voice. I want to use my power to disrupt oppressive structures,  and I think that scholars of critical pedagogy (Freire, Giroux, MacLaren) would say that teachers, in fact, should not be neutral. Lensmire uses the metaphor of a novelist and Bakhtin's concepts of monologic and polyphonic novels to make a point about the power of a teacher.
The novelist moves with power in relation to the character in both monologic and polyphonic novels.  The question, then, is not whether the novelist does or does not exert control, but to what end the novelist's power is put. In the monologic novel, the novelist's power is used to create a single worldview, praised and elaborated by the subordinate voices of subordinate characters. In the polyphonic novel, the novelist's power is used to create multiple, conflicting worlds embodied in the voices  of divers characters. The polyphonic novelist arranges situations and encounters with other characters that provide and clarify the characters' own perspectives...as Bakhtin put it: "The issue here is not an absence of, but a radical change in, the author's position" (p. 67). And that radical change is in the service of the destruction of a single, dominating, monologic worldview. (Lensmire 39)
The teacher's role then, if we can substitute teacher for author as Lensmire intends, is to help students make sense of their own worldview and their place in it while bringing into the conversation other worldviews being careful not to reproduce the monologic paradigm of traditional pedagogies by enforcing their own worldview. When I talk of disrupting oppressive structures, I am thinking about traditional schooling as a "plot in which a person's social position or category determines her relations with the institution and the people within it...where the humanness or uniqueness of an individual has no decisive influence on how the story turns out...by sorting and classifying" (42).

I am thinking about the twelve students assigned to me last year whom the district admittedly failed, students in our school since kindergarten but permanently sorted into Title One services only to arrive in eighth grade still "failing" the ACCESS test and reading a the "third grade" level according to NWEA testing. There was nothing categorical about these individuals, and only have "finishing" the prescribed, teacher-proof program, did we all discover the student's life outside the classroom was what Lensmire calls "an adventure." Our classroom became a workshop where the students, for the first time, were asked to take up a new relation with their teacher and peers -- to teach each other, write with each other, talk to each other, and even each with each other. The child's voice emerged out this opportunity to speak and write out their experiences -- both real and imagined. It was only because we asked each other to tell stories that their lives became as important as the literature we were reading. They saw that their experiences and their traumas -- and there were many traumas -- are worth telling. And it was only through sharing those stories and hearing people's questions that they found points of crisis to "explore and expose" in their writing. Some chose to expose this in fiction (like the student who created a character to be an upstander), but some left blank pages saying that they were not ready to explore that crisis yet. The blank page actually spoke volumes.  The key here is that, for many of these students, they had been obedience in filling out worksheets and repeating what teachers told them. They learned to write by writing what the teacher told them to write, and when they produced what they were told, they were encouraged -- even rewarded with candy.These students were coerced for so many years by institutional authority, and I didn't really stop the coercion, to be honest. As you can see, I did not resist interfering with the meaning students were trying to make. I told Julia that the poem about her baby brother's laughter was worth writing, and I told Juanita that a story about the smell in the visiting center where her father is in jail is worth exploring in a vignette.Yes, we talk about craft and figurative language, but we also talk about what it means. I actually go even further into their business, however, when I talk about what I know and think about the world and the people in it. I push -- yes, I push -- for the meanings and values in the poems and stories asking What is the message here? What do you want me to feel and discover? What value are you putting into the world? What ideas are living in these words that will go out and shape the world? This is why I always ask for a "letter to the reader" (me) about what choices were made and why. However, I don't think what we did last year was for the sake of reading and writing. Our dialogue was about writing to make sense of the ways we are in the world and noticing, even valuing, how our ways of being are different. Lisa Delpit would have teachers take that further to say that teachers should not only make visible the differences between individuals but to make visible the "rules of power" and how society values ways of being in the world.

I think Lensmire would name the work I described above as "deliberation." When students find these beautiful, powerful moments in their lives to explore and expose, they need to also consider how their rendering of those moments  is "bound up with the cultures they inhabit and that inhabit them." So much of schooling is about the individual, and so much about the writing workshop is about honoring the individual stories of students, but this has been at the expense of silencing the hierarchy of cultures and   "meanings and values of family, community, and peers, " in different cultures (51). While I am interested in teaching students how to express themselves through writing, I am also interested in that participatory aspect of democracy thinking about how reading and writing (and other literacies) can foster a participation and then a critical engagement with their world. For this reason, I think that it is not enough to have students express themselves or their world. They need  frameworks for understanding their own worldview and access to other worldviews to see the intersection of such frameworks. The self does not exist in a vacuum. It is formed by social relations.  Lensmire quotes Joseph Harris (1987): "Writing is not simply a tool we use to express a self we already have; it is a means by which we form a self to express" (161). Lensmire clarifies that the self is not necessarily determined by cultural resources, but "the resources available -- the experiences, languages, histories, and stories -- obviously constrain the possible selves you can become" (63). What critical pedagogy asks for, then, is that students become active participants in the construction of their worlds. Are my students beginning to see that they can, in fact, shape their path? Once they realized that their academic and  thus social path was controlled by this test that they didn't think twice about -- ACCESS -- they certainly felt that they at least held a hammer. And this was just the beginning of the unveiling of the framework.

When students come to me with a cute story or a poem, the critical pedagogue I fancy myself to be,  I have to question. I have to ask them why?I have to ask them for the meaning of this writing and what it contributes or silences. Yes, sometimes they just want to write about pandas, but I do ask "Why pandas? Why is this what you know and what interest you? How did you come to prefer this creature? What are you not writing about  because you chose pandas?"  I think, and Lensmire seems to agree, that we have to take up a critical position as to the meaning of students' writing, and we have to question their intentions. If we don't do this, students' work will not get beyond expression and individualistic in a world dependent on relations. Giroux writes:
Developing a pedagogy that takes the notion of student voice seriously means developing a critically affirmative language that works both with and on the experiences that students bring to the classroom. This means taking seriously and confirming the language forms, modes of reasoning, dispositions, and histories that give students an active voice in defining the world; it also means working on the experiences of such students in order for them to examine both their strengths and weaknesses. (1991, 104)
Great. Now we have all these participating voices, but Lensmire asks what if those voices "sound too much like the already existing world." He questions critical pedagogues as seeming "overconfident that student voice will flourish in the face of questioning." The "critical" point here is to provide access to worldviews that will help students answer the questions or, better yet, ask more questions  and explore and expose those questions in their writing.  Lensmire talks of "appropriation" as
the activity of the self in the face of cultural resources  [where] the individual responds to and transforms the utterances of others in the production of her own speaking and writing. Thus, on one hand, the idea of appropriation reminds us that our voices are dependent on the voices of others who preceded us and provides us with words to use...On the other hand, ...[it] highlights the taking over, the working over, by individuals, of the language of others. (77). 
And so with the carefully chosen texts that read multiple world views, students will have a consciousness about how their world views were constructed as through this "crisis" or realization create something new, something that is still theirs but is now deliberately collective. They are not merely repeating the old -- what teachers or text told them -- but  entering the conversation and "taking a position in relation to others and the meanings and values that precede us" while also "revising that position, that voice, across time" (84).

Essentially, the teacher has to engage and exert some power to position students in relation to others in their own culture and that of others so that their voices develop. Is this the "develop" of capitalism? No, we are not talking about creating a workforce. It is about students awakening , being conscious. This has not been met without resistance -- to say the least. The students I mentioned above complain about having to think all the time. They are fighting the voices of their parents and siblings and teachers  from whom they've learned; they are fighting the person they are "supposed" to be. (Julia wants to be a mom like her older sister who is 16 with two kids. And Juanita think she is like her sister destined to be in the alternative high school with the "loser".) Lensmire writes, "there is pain that often accompanies saying this , and not that. Students need others if their voices are to continue to develop. Within the classroom, they need teachers who recognize their struggles for voice, and help them transform these struggles into occasions for becoming" (84). Their lives have not been written, and as participants, with the practice being participants,  they can shape not only their future, but that of the collective. And as the teacher participant, I will help. They will interact with others outside and inside their primary associations -- even if the school is determined to control this through sorting-- they will encounter different ways of acting, thinking and feeling. Lensmire suggests that we 1) recognize what he calls "friendship groups" granting them the right to choose who they need for comfort, information and inspiration and 2) create "public spaces, sharing times, within which meaning and values issuing from these groups are questioned, shaken for integrity, deliberated, and reconstructed" (96).  Here we are doing what Lensmire say is "actively seeking to understand" what others are saying (and why and how). We have to shake students of the traditional value of silence and obedience in the classroom and cultivate inclusivity, participation and critical engagement.

July 18, 2012

The Literary Imagination (Langer)


1937, Guernica by Picasso on display at MOMO


The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination (1975)
Lawrence L. Langer

"The very dilemma which has inspired so much critical controversy -- a univers concentrationnaire which refuses to be subjugated by the rules of traditional rhetoric, but which asserts the essential realities of its hell in spite of the dry husks of verbal formulae which contain or express them" (63).

Langer's contribution to literary criticism is his genre of "literature of atrocity"; he asks his readers to consider what it has achieved,  and he wants to call this body of literature to the attention of readers. He is interested in how a writer has devised an idiom and a style for the unspeakable. This book attempts to impose some critical order on a selected imaginative works around the themes of
  •  the aesthetic problem of reconciling normalcy with horror;
  • the displacement of the consciousness if life by the immanence and pervasiveness if death;
  •  the violation of childhood; 
  • the assault on physical reality; 
  • the distinction of rational intelligence; and 
  • the disruption of chronological time.
He begins with an examination of Art saying that it is not its "transfiguration of empirical reality but its disfiguration, the conscious and deliberate alienation of the reader's sensibilities from the world of the usual and familiar, with an accompanying infiltration into the work if the grotesque, the senseless, and the unimaginable,to  such a degree that the possibility of aesthetic pleasure ...is intrinsically eliminated" (3).  The uncertain nature of the experience recorded, combined with the reader's feeling of puzzled involvement in it, prohibits Adorno's well cited fear that there should be no poetry after Auschwitz in that the reader may discern in the inconceivable fate of the victims. The principle of aesthetic stylization such as the sequence and structure is one way that art forces us to search for more adequate basis for apprehending the human suffering because it leaves us with mystery and silence. Art performs the paradox of incomprehension despite the logic of language and structure. If we consider the forces of historical fact and imaginative truth, Langer offers that we will see that literature is never wholly invented and never wholly factual --the task of the artist, then, is making such reality possible for the imagination.

Langer quotes Gilman: "If anything, literature, like all art, is the account of what history has failed to produce on its own, so that men had to step in to make good the deficiency" (9). The deficiency is, I think, what Langer calls the "unity of impression." Cleary, the Holocaust experience cannot evoke it; "art of atrocity is unsettling art indifferent to the peace that passeth understanding and intent only on reclaiming for the present, not the experience of the horror itself...but a framework for responding to it, for making if imaginatively (if not literally) accessible... wrestling from silence the language that had survived its fearful events but lacked the eloquence and precision of vocabulary to describe it" (13). The language that was wrestling from the silence, however, comes with a distrust for sufficiency of language.Langer quotes Steiner who actually thinks that the art of literature can do something that testimony cannot. Steiner suggests that perhaps it is only those who had no part in the events who can focus in them rationally and imaginatively; to those who experienced the thing, it has lost the hard edges if possibility, it has stepped outside the real (20). However, Langer reminds us that some survivors became writers because they arrived at a different conclusion (Levi).

Normalcy and Horror: Langer then moves to examining the difference between violence and atrocity. What event occurs for "no apparent reason"? An explicable event :in the sense that a cause and effect exist the connection between agent and victims is clear and suffering seems to be a direct consequence of the impetus behind it. Atrocity, on the other hand, has its consequences in excess of the situations that  inspired them; but because its literary expression is rooted in a historical reality  that haunts the reader we cannot dismiss it as we might some other literature from Dickens or Poe. This conclusion goes against that of Clendinnen who can easily dismiss fiction and does not feel obligated to attend to it as she does testimony or "purely" historical texts. Therefore, Langer says that the task of artist is to find a form and style to present the atmosphere or landscape of atrocity to make it compelling, to coax the reader into credulity- and ultimately, complicity. The task of the critic, then, is not to ask whether it should be done since it had been but to ask how it had been done, to judge its effectiveness and analyze its implications for literature and society (22).

Pervasiveness of Death: Literature of atrocity "reverses the customary growth toward insight that fiction has trained the imagination to expect by transforming death into a vital image and reducing life to an aborted journey" (65). The narrator of the fiction is forced by the discovery of death what it means to die and "the state of insane desolation to which we are reduced when life is done." The melancholy conclusion of the literature of atrocity offers death as a collective tragedy altering the meaning of life. Langer examines Pierre Gascar's The Season of the Dead  to explore the narrator confrontation between the pre-Holocaust reality and the l'univers concentrationnarire. Gascar uses language to "lure the imagination" but we see the experience of the narrator alientates him from himself and his values, so Langer asks "what effect must it have on his audience?" Langer writes, ""Gascar chooses his metaphors and similes as weapons to assault the sensibilities and break down any remaining reluctance on the part of the reader to accept the 'abnormal' world of his fiction as an accurate reflection of modern reality" (68).
  • Can art indeed conjure a reality that itself must remain forever unredeemable? It has made an attempt groping toward a possibility that tests its resourcefulness and perhaps defines its limitations.
  • Aesthetic distance or indifference: indifference is a failure of the artists imagination ti seduce the spectator into a feeling of complicity with the material of his drama
  • Complicity what does Langer mean!
  • Using historical evidence: piling atrocity on atrocity without imaginative orientation for the development of the  human faculty to be disoriented ; the artist can make the testimony accessible  yet leave the inhabitants of the literary edifice incredulous and dismayed --- talking about the failure of The Investigation
  • Literature of innuendo : author were conspiring with his readers to recapture an atmosphere of insane misery which they somehow shared, without wishing to name or describe it in detail
  • Imagery of insulation: insulation separating two worlds and the effect of one upon the other and the reverse... The colors, the time, the temperature , the textures, the clarity or veiling... Shades and tones of sketching visions of the unspeakable  43
  • Verisimilitude is insufficient: some quality of the fantastic stylistic or descriptive become essential; precise details may overlook the existence in a middle realm between life and death with its ambiguous and inconsistent appeals ti survival and extinction which continuously undermined the logic if experience without offering any satisfactory alternative--- distortions wrought by their veils if fantasy only illuminate the terrors of the reality with an unholier flow 43
  • Dreams as an answer to problems of characterization  and style which novelists exploiting this material will have to confront-- the creation of  characters with divided and often uncomplimentary sensibilities, passive, or with exaggerated impulses like capacity for cruelty-- dream exposé something about the mental states and motives--but the have to be surrealistic and fragmentary where rational details are brought into fantastic juxtapositions and made more rather than less coherent   --- it is unlike other fiction compelled to employ the implications of fact to create its unique aesthetic appeal46
  • Irrrealism: impact of holocaust on dreams of survivors and then use dreams or surreal to capture the disorientation
  • Death in this genre is not concerned with whether one must die it that one must die- the question of other fictions and the growth focused readers-- but how it would happen, so the artist is faced within fusing literature with a sense of dying unimaginable in pre- holocaust
  • The reader will experience what Clendinnen calls the Gorgon effect. The discomfort engendered by the uncertainties that will account for the psychological and emotional rejection provoked by the content of the literature of atrocity, and I would argue that the content of literature is quite different than that of ' history."  The reader, if he persists and does not reject as in the Gorgon effect, becomes a temporary inhabitant of uc recreating in collaboration with the artist the features of reality that history had declared extinct but which continue to haunt the memory and imagination with echoes of unquenchable despair 73.   I don't think you can go this far as to say the reader inhabits

  • Eric Kahler--"true art create a new reality as a new sphere of conscious life; true art has an exploratory quality; true art  lifts into the  light of our consciousness a state of affairs,a layer of existence, that was dormant in the depth of our unconscious that was buried under obsolete forms, conventions, habits of thought and experience."

  • Anne Frank does not pretend to concern itself with the uniqueness of the reality transforming  life outside the attic walls that insulated her vision confirming the sentimentality of an audience that pursues Anne's reality that us unable or unwilling to peer beyond the end of her tale to the new reality symbolized by her wretched death 77
  • Night challenges her (Anne's) epitaph about believing people are good; the difficult struggle between language and truth that every author must engage in and the important distinctions it draws between the holocaust itself and it's tale; what really happened and what we tell about what happened... The power of the imagination to evoke an atmosphere does far more than the historian's fidelity to fact to involve the uninitiated reader in the atmosphere of the holocaust 79; Wiesel the writer has transcended history and autobiography and used the imagery if atrocity and his own experience to involve the non participant in the essence of its world
  • With historical info - numbers, places, names- cease to affect the mind or imagination not because they lack significance but  because the mind and imagination lack a suitable context for the information; thus Wiesel focuses on the implications and selects scenes and feelings creating an indispensable vestibule for anyone wishing to venture farther into it 83
  • Schizophrenic art the art of atrocity 88
  • Fiction: scenic organization, characterization through dialogue, periodic. Lunacies, elimination of superfluous or repetitive episodes, ability to arouse empathy of his readers, which elusive to writers bound by fidelity to fact...and I would argue that fact is just as elusive and does not access the  imagination that I'd capable of empathy; to evoke rather than describe the  two world- pre and during holocaust

  • Inadequacy of this supposed  common consciousness: authors had to fight a reader reluctance based nit on an inability to understand but on the alleged assumption of the reader that he understood it too well, that there is little need to burden the human imagination with further morbid explorations of horrible reality which anyone with s long memory is ready aquainted 91

  • Problem of tension: actuality events that literally occurred and reality the attempts of the mind to absorb such events into literary harmony or to compose a new dissonance that make endurable and meaningful to the imaginative ear 92
  • The theoretical dilemma of the suffering of children: have characters bear literary witness to a portion of reality which eluded classification among conceivable and endurable human experience;iterate technique is contrived descriptive realism designed to offend the reader's sense of justice 131
  • Dostoevsky and Camus dramatize child suffering from the point of view of adult visions; neither had attempted to recreate the universe of their suffering from the pov of the children's confused and tormented eyes; the resulting concentration and intensity of outlook ANd action would have imposed limitations too restrictive to the artistic designs if their works 133--the child not capable of mature insight but this world would result in the new imaginative world which Camus anticipated when he called in the artists of his time  to create dangerously:' an equilibrium between reality and man's rejection of that reality... Different from the everyday world and yet the same, particular yet universal, full of innocent insecurity' 134
  • Fiction will leave confusions in a void of uncertainty-- the same void characters inhabit and in turn reproduces the atmosphere if baffled apprehension  139; the behavior of children as children is consistently framed by fear as their inner desire to retain the securities of their youth impinges on the oppression that disrupts the normalcy of their lives; let's pretend only intensifies fright

  • The moment one speaks of the reality of the holocaust, one is compelled to include its unreality find the two coexist as a fundamental principle of creation; the style of the modern novel does not seek to inform  as dues the chronicle, the testimony offered in evidence, or the scientific report, it constitutes reality. It never knows what it is seeking, it is ignorant if what it had to say; it is invention, invention of the world and if man, constant invention and perpetual interrogation Alain Robert-grilley- for a new novel, essays on fiction 1965
  • Bewitching paradox if the art of atrocity: like music it depends on sound  not stillness for its aesthetic effect  , starts with a harmony. Includes familiar associations  then adds dissonance( as should teaching) that abruptly undercuts the continuity and produces an intellectual  shock ... Lacking verbal equivalent that resounds fr the silence through its absence; two worlds collide in unspoken dialogue

  • Endings-- lit if atrocity dies not have to be specific not could it be since the very nature of the reality it seeks to apprehend repudiates the mind's attempt to organize its insights into s comprehensive pattern or to suggest an interpretation of the events if the fiction consistent with the expectations of reason or tradition 163
  • Ending and reader: speechless with a giant silence of the brain and a paralysis of the emotions rather than empathy is with the literature of atrocity substitutes for Aristotle's idea of predation not the green leaf of having shared the tragic destiny of the heroic a fallible human character but I kind of stupefied uncertainty as to whether or not the events we have encountered have actually occurred and so as fantasy or reflection of authentic experience 164
  • Suffering of victims:  the specific forces behind he suffering of the victims are as anonymous as they themselves are destined to become and the choice of children as victims compounds the anonymity and intensifies the atmosphere of intimidation
  • Metaphor and Extreme youth -- an opportunity to trace the evolution of a still unformed human creature's response to atrocity with immediacy because of the imaginative universe using metaphor as a device for evoking the atmosphere of terror; rather than diminishing. The evil and horror if the real atrocities they make them feel less strange less unique and less alien... So more terrible and  more tolerable
  • The author may have nothing to do with the literary experience but reflects the philosophy of the reader who sees himself as a potential victim and flees from the consequence if this possibility -- clendinnen's gorgon effect 175
  • the question of deciphering motive-- fiction can help us humanity's dilemma in trying to account for the unaccountable and the lengths we will go rather than accept the possibility of the pure will to torture and destruction as a valid expression of human instinct under certain historical and psychological circumstances 179
  • Discard implied action through dialogue and draw the reader into the physical substance of reality; words are illusory veils that disintegrate upon touch penetrating the intellectual facade of the reader as spectator and reaches the organs and nerve ends of his being  dissipating aesthetic distance and creating a reader engage a direct emotional participant in the experience if atrocity 182

  • parody of Bildungsroman: parody this that educates a youthful protagonist in the ways of society so that he may enter into some kind of productive or creative alliance with it.... A bleak, hostile, Solitary future 189

  • Temporality: The tragedy of a crime always remains with the living 190
Chronological : exploring precedents in time
Antichronological-- inner world- a sundering of each generation from the other; the unique quality of the evil rife during this period entrenched it in the private mind disqualifying it from the possibility of shared experience of communal suffering; time not as an indefinite continuous concept but as separate units which; must not be related and become history 273( missing link that joins cause to effect and reason to result ; external rituals that displaced the active inner moral life 282

Nonchronological - one event while the narrator reaches backward on time and forward establishing s fictional pattern that deliberately violates normal sequence without substituting any definable, alternative temporal scheme yo guide the floundering reader  285; Reader must learn to recognize the unannounced time shifts by the allusions that mark it a technique to suggest the voyage to Buchenwald and the camp experience have severed past from future-- the reality of a nightmare; once inside this experience one never entirely regains the feeling of being outside


Issues of Representation (Clendinnen)

Reading the Holocaust (1999)
Inga Clendinnen
 "The doing of history, our ongoing conversation with the dead, rests in the critical evaluation of all the voices coming from the past, in our reconstruction of the circumstances of their speaking, and on our critical evaluation of our own 'natural' unexamined responses to those voices" (21).


Richard Rorty says that we need to be educated in the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers and that with such imaginative ability we'd be readier to count the cost of our own gratifications and to  temper our quests for autonomy and abundance (163).  Clendinnen examines issues of representation in her book Reading the Holocaust where she examines the texts of various actors in the Holocaust including survivors, those in the Resistance, and, controversially, the "perpetrators" from Himmler to SS officers to Sodderkomandos. Of interests to my work is her examination of representation, specifically her concerns with fiction.

The novel has the task of reaching the moral imagination, and according to Rorty, the novel can be the prime educator of the popular imagination. Is the novel, however, seeking to extend our knowledge or assume it? Clandennen suggests there are innate difficulties in the successful literary representation of the process of genocide, specifically the Holocaust.  Such problems are with representation: any representation may appear a falsification or sentinentalisation of the general condition. In these fictions, ones that she cites as perhaps more effective than others,  it is "the reader struggling for a foothold, finding none, who is the protagonist feeling the moral vertigo investing that cursed place" (169). But  does this author of fiction have to have been there in order to write effective fiction, to reach the moral imagination? That the authors are "selecting, shaping , and inventing" out of direct participation and observation more valid than author who is inventing without having been a firsthand witness? Why is it insufficient for the author to have been a listener as Felman in Testimony might argue? And, if the author is a first hand witness, can the author create fiction and thus separate from the genre of "survival testimony"? Is fiction, in fact, a place where subjective experience can be represented with high art by a witness-artist? And if so, what happens to the testimony of witnesses who are not artists? Can't the artist be the listener in that case?

Clendinnen talks about the "been there" quality that supplies an under text of intimate moral implication never present in pure fiction. When comparing History and Fiction, she says that each establishes quite different relationships between writer and subject and writer and reader. Fiction, for example, provide access to inner thoughts and secret actions of closed others  that can teach about life; however, the fiction world contains a "curious absence" in that the only responsibility of the reader is to respond to what the text says. Clendinnen, as the reader, feelsno human responsibility towards these people saying because the characters are fiction that the compassion is fiction; you know the people are fiction. In nonfiction, however, there is no creator to strip away the characters'  veils, so the protagonist will be opaque to the reader who will engage with them differently because of the moral relationship --as a fellow human being whose blood is real and death is final (170).  Thus, Clendinnen argues, the reader assumes a different contract with the writer depending on whether the writer is "offering me fiction or claiming to report on this mundane world." Indeed, the rich accounts of physical circumstance and interior states that fiction provides are the freedoms and riches  of  the privilege of fiction not to be simulated in historical writings as it would violate the historian's unstated but binding contract both with their reader -- to stay in close contact with evidence -- and with their characters, the once real people they have chosen to represent (171).

So, Clendinnen is concerned with the costs of fiction's freedoms  claiming she has not forgiven Nabokov "for installing those images in my mind, because they are gratuitous, things of his own invention"  and that she stapled together the pages of Bend Sinister dealing with the death of David Krug (172). She is not compelled to heed the text as it is "only" fiction and that she is under no "obligation to attend" saying she could close the book (as she could do of nonfiction, too). Her point is that "we" listen differently to stories we know are "real" versus stories that are invented. While she says that we marvel at the imagination of a fiction writer and are brought to wonder at ourselves when faced with "real thought and actions," I find that she is truly dismissive of the artist endeavor of a writer who truly does intend to render real thought and action and truly does expect the reader to attend. Real thought and action coming from a survivor or a a perpetrator is a rendering of a lived experience; what of an artist who listens and then renders -- only with the skill to reach the moral imagination and create that moral vertigo in that reader?

Clendinnen does say that writing is our best bet at understanding history, but also says that the historian is best suited for this task of "speaking for the dead: because they "take this libery under the rule of the discipline, and the rule is strict"; she goes on to say that "historians must retrieve  and represent the actualities of past experience in accordance with our rule, with patience, skepticism and curiosity, and with whatever art we can muster -- provided always that the art remains subject to our rule" (182). (However, she ends her book with a poem saying the poem says "much of what I have been trying to say over these pages in as many words. ") Nevertheless, we can agree on this point: "writers must destroy silence in order to represent it" (177).  The writer -- and I think it has to be an artist - has the task of mediating an experience --in fact, all access to experience must be mediated -- but Clendinnen believes that the very words are solid representations of that which is quite obscure because memory can be unstable; nevertheless, the written word brings an "awareness of a truth that the daily work of living,  like the daily work of doing history,  tempts us to forget."


In the shadow of the Holocaust none of us is at home in the world because now we know the fragility if our content. If we are to see the Gorgon sufficiently steadily to destroy it, we cannot afford to be blinded  by reverence or abashed into silence or deflected into a search for reassuring myths. We must do more than register guilt, or grief, or anger, or disgust, because neither reverence for those who suffer nor revulsion from those who inflict this suffering will help us overcome its power to paralyze, or to see if clearly. (182)
Milan Kundera : The struggle of men against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting (183).


  • We need to know both ourselves and the worlds we are capable of making if we can hope to change any pat if either. 16
  • The  gorgon effect -- do not look away at the reality that it is within our human content that such atrocities happen; we are the agents -- look
  • The problem of transcendence 20
  • Wiesel says only survivors may speak because no one who has not experienced this event will ever be able up understand it
  • Historians have to think  hard about how the documents before them relate to the actuality they are trying to retrieve and understand
  • The eloquent episode: the apparently trivial moment which illuminates a world 43
  • Survivor of camp- Levi; Resistance - Charlotte delbo;Sonderkommando- the prominents--mullet; Fried lander -- look at all of history's actors to understand
  • To get all povs we need multiple stories why not a novel? The artist will bear witness to the testimony and render the truth
  • Why should we look?  How dare we look at such degradation? What are we meant to learn from this viewing if a fellow human in extremist? 54 Such things are done because men and women willed them and were able to implement their will; we would be fools not to try to understand as precisely as we are able how that situation came about 54
  • Moral imperative to be attentive
  • Wood:  the unusual but not impossible demand the dead make upon the living
  • Problem of asking identification: Do no ask for it. Our understanding will be as imperfect as our grasp  of all subjectivities-- we do not need identification but a long route of meandering observation, inference. And experiment 89 not attempting to identify with hitler if we are trying to understand the structure of ideology
  • To understand us not to justify or excuse
  • Analysts gave to attune their ears to what is in effect a new language masquerading as a familiar one: a language where a term like anti- semitism dies not mean spite or malice but the active conviction that every Jewish adult, child and infant is a dangerous enemy 93
  • Banality of evil: incapable of self scrutiny, blandness of the surface presented for our inspection on the first person narrative; we need help making it accessible to our understanding in wars their -- hoess himmler- could not 107
  • Cognitive imbalance-to create balance either your attitude to one or the other has to change
  • Grossman - the history if warfare is the history if conditioning men to overcome their innate resistance to killing their fellow human beings
  • Social plasticity if emotions alerts us to the possibilities too easily masked from us by our casual assumptions as to what constitutes the normal 126
  • Habituation
  • To not invoke evil or extra- human capitalisation accepts killers as human as Brownings work argues...explaining is not excusing and understanding is not forgiving... Could I have been moved to do the same? Asking this question forces us into the serious , imaginative reconstruction of a particular circumstance, temperament and personal history, and of the uncertainties haunting the whole enterprise of retrieval, which together constitute historical understanding 132
  • Participatory rituals: texts in performance or acted texts are invaluable because they are public and viewable the heart made creation of whatever group it is we are trying to understand 141... Theatrical  reanimating the sense of purpose and invincibility authenticating the realism of an absurd ideology  
  • Fiction offer access to the mute and silences beyond actions; we retreat to pathological psychology ... If such creatures live among us -- creatures acting beyond the theatrical  expectations-- we  must be careful to deny them the conditions and opportunities for their self realization 155